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6 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
7 **SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

8 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
9

CASE NO. 12-CR-236 - IEG

10 **ORDER:**

11  
12 v.

**(1) DENYING RUDY ESPUDO’S  
MOTION TO SUPPRESS ALL  
WIRE AND ORAL  
COMMUNICATION  
INTERCEPTIONS ON  
MINIMIZATION GROUNDS [Doc.  
No. 983]; and**

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15 RUDY ESPUDO (1); FRANCISCO  
16 GUTIERREZ (6),

17 Defendants.

**(2) DENYING FRANCISCO  
GUTIERREZ’S MOTION TO  
SUPPRESS WIRETAP EVIDENCE  
AND DERIVATIVE EVIDENCE  
FOR FAILURE TO MINIMIZE  
THE INTERCEPTED  
COMMUNICATIONS [Doc. No.  
975]**

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20 Presently before the Court is Defendant Rudy Espudo’s (“Espudo”) motion to  
21 suppress all wire and oral communication interceptions on minimization grounds.  
22 [Doc. No. 983, Espudo’s Mot.] Also before the Court is Defendant Francisco  
23 Gutierrez’s (“Gutierrez”) motion to suppress wiretap evidence and derivative  
24 evidence for failure to minimize the intercepted communications. [Doc. No. 975,  
25 Gutierrez’s Mot.] For the following reasons, the Court **DENIES** both motions.

26 **BACKGROUND**

27 This case involves charges of conspiracy, racketeering, illegal drug  
28 distribution, extortion, and money laundering in connection with the Mexican Mafia

1 prison gang and several affiliated Sureno street gangs operating in northern San  
2 Diego county. Defendant Gutierrez filed a motion to suppress on April 1, 2013.  
3 [Id.] Defendant Espudo filed a subsequent motion to suppress on April 2, 2013.  
4 [Doc. No. 983, Espudo's Mot.] The Government filed a consolidated response in  
5 opposition to the motions on April 8, 2013. [Doc. No. 1004, Govt.'s Opp.] On  
6 April 17, 2013, Defendant Espudo filed a reply to the Government's response.  
7 [Doc. No. 1014, Espudo's Reply.] The Court heard related oral argument from the  
8 parties on April 19, 2013 and May 16, 2013. The Court held an evidentiary hearing  
9 on May 16, 2013 where FBI Special Agent Mathew Zeman ("Agent Zeman")  
10 testified.

11 On May 23, 2013, Defendant Espudo had a change of plea hearing before this  
12 Court, where all pending motions were withdrawn. At oral argument on April 19,  
13 2013 and May 16, 2013, the Court deemed all parties joined in both motions. [Doc.  
14 Nos. 1017, 1061.] Accordingly, Defendant Espudo's motion remains pending as to  
15 the remaining Defendants.<sup>1</sup>

## 16 DISCUSSION

### 17 **I. Minimization**

18 The Fourth Amendment governs wiretap surveillance. United States v. Petti,  
19 973 F.2d 1441, 1443 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 50-  
20 53 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967)). "The [Supreme]  
21 Court made clear that if certain conditions were met, wiretapping authorized by  
22 warrant would pass constitutional muster." Petti, 973 F.2d at 1443 (citing Berger,  
23 388 U.S. at 54-60; Katz, 389 U.S. at 354-56). "Congress codified the requirements  
24 of Berger and Katz in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act  
25 of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 ('Title III')." Petti, 973 F.2d at 1443.

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28 <sup>1</sup> Notwithstanding Defendant Espudo's withdrawal, for clarity, the Court will refer herein to  
Doc. No. 983 as Espudo's motion.

1 “Wiretapping authorized under Title III has been found to comply with the Fourth  
2 Amendment.” United States v. Silberman, 732 F.Supp. 1057, 1058 (S.D. Cal. 1990)  
3 (citing United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 158-59 (9th Cir. 1975)).

4 Title III provides that wiretapping or electronic surveillance “shall be  
5 conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not  
6 otherwise subject to interception . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5); see also United States  
7 v. McGuire, 307 F.3d 1192, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002). “Minimization requires that the  
8 government adopt reasonable measures to reduce to a practical minimum the  
9 interception of conversations unrelated to the criminal activity under investigation  
10 while permitting the government to pursue legitimate investigation.” Id. “The  
11 United States Supreme Court has stressed that, because of the necessarily ad hoc  
12 nature of any determination of reasonableness, there can be no inflexible rule of law  
13 that will decide every case.” Id. (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 139  
14 (1978)). “The minimization techniques used do not need to be optimal, only  
15 reasonable.” United States v. Rivera, 527 F.3d 891, 904 (9th Cir. 2008).

16 “The government has the burden to show proper minimization.” Id. at 904.  
17 Whether the government complied with the statutory requirement to minimize  
18 requires the court to examine the monitoring officers’ conduct in light of the  
19 particular circumstances. Scott, 436 U.S. at 140. “Our cases *require* the district  
20 court to conduct an evidentiary hearing when the moving papers filed in connection  
21 with a pre-trial suppression motion show that there are contested issues of fact  
22 relating to the lawfulness of a search.” United States v. Mejia, 69 F.3d 309, 318  
23 (9th Cir. 1995).

24 Defendant Espudo brings the present motion to suppress on the ground that  
25 “the interception technology employed in the investigation of this case failed to  
26 comply with the minimization requirements of the wire orders, the Fourth  
27 Amendment, and Title III because “recording of telephone call interceptions did  
28 occur without monitoring.” [Doc. No. 983-1, Espudo’s Mot. at 1-2, 11.]

1 Additionally, both Espudo and Gutierrez bring their motions on the grounds that  
2 there was a failure to properly minimize monitored calls, and that communications  
3 unrelated to the offenses for which the wiretap was authorized were intercepted.  
4 [Id.; Doc. No. 975-1, Gutierrez's Mot. at 4.]

5 **A. Voicebox Interception Technology**

6 Espudo alleges that the Government uses an interception technology called  
7 VB Unified Collection Management System, or Voicebox, which is owned and  
8 manufactured by a Canadian company, JSI Telecom ("JSI").<sup>2</sup> Espudo states that  
9 Voicebox "is a server-based data collection system designed to intercept electronic  
10 communications and distribute them across a network of workstations that are used  
11 to monitor and analyze intercepted information." [Doc. No. 983-1, Espudo's Mot.  
12 at 3.] Espudo, relying on the system configuration in the Canadian Ahmad case,  
13 believes that the system is problematic in terms of minimization because it "can be  
14 configured to record everything, record without monitoring when the monitors are  
15 too busy to monitor all target calls, and/or to record each call for a preset time." [Id.  
16 at 4.] Espudo notes that in the U.S. cases where Kane and Stewart testified,  
17 recording without monitoring was not the issue. [Id.]

18 The Government counters that the version of Voicebox used for the present  
19 wiretaps does not provide for the ability to record portions of a telephone  
20 conversation that was minimized. [Doc. No. 1004, Govt.'s Opp. at 11.] The  
21 Government provided the declaration of Barry Stewart, a JSI representative, to  
22 present the relevant facts. [Doc. No. 1004-1, Ex. F at 50-52.] Stewart states that the  
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24 <sup>2</sup> Espudo's facts relating to Voicebox are from the testimony of Bruce Kane, a software  
25 engineer at JSI who had worked on Voicebox, in United States v. Villasenor, U.S.  
26 District Court for the Eastern District of California, Case No. 07-CR-248; the  
27 testimony of Barry Stewart, an Electronic Engineering Technologist and regional sales  
28 manager for JSI, in United States v. West, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District  
of Michigan, Case No. 06-20185; the Canadian Court decision in R. v. Ahmad, [2010]  
O.J. No. 3342 (Justice Dawson); and a review of the interception discovery provided  
in this case. [Doc. No. 983-1, Espudo's Mot. at 2-3.]

1 San Diego FBI used Voicebox Version 3.8, “which only provides for live  
2 monitoring of intercepted conversations.” [Id. at 51, ¶ 2.] Stewart explains that  
3 “[i]n order for live monitoring to occur with FBI San Diego’s Voicebox Version  
4 3.8, an individual must both be logged into the monitoring system and have actually  
5 selected a line to monitor.” [Id. ¶ 3.]

6 Regarding recording, Stewart explains that “when a call is minimized, the  
7 conversation is not recorded in any location.” [Id. ¶ 4.] When a call is being  
8 monitored by an individual and is not being minimized, it is recorded to a single  
9 file, which is stored on a server maintained by FBI San Diego. [Id.] When no  
10 individual is logged in to the system, the calls are not recorded. These calls can  
11 never be heard because there was no live monitor at the time they were made. [Id.  
12 ¶ 6.]

13 Finally, Stewart explains that the Voicebox software configuration used in  
14 Canada is different from the one used in the United States. [Id. ¶ 7.] In accordance  
15 with Canadian law, the Voicebox software used in Canada “may be configured to  
16 allow for all calls to be recorded for a given telephone line, regardless of whether a  
17 monitor is logged into the system and listening to the call.” [Id.] Additionally, “the  
18 Canadian configuration . . . allows users to listen to a portion of a call while it is  
19 occurring and then ‘put away’ the entire call until it can be reselected at a later  
20 time.” [Id.] Only the Canadian system allows entire calls to be recorded regardless  
21 of whether a monitor is listening live. [Id.] Stewart states that the system used by  
22 FBI San Diego does not have these capabilities. [Id.]

23 Agent Zeman testified on May 16, 2013 consistently with Stewart’s  
24 declaration. Agent Zeman testified that if a call is not actively selected by an  
25 individual to be monitored, then it is not recorded. Agent Zeman explained that  
26 only calls that are listened to live are recorded. Agent Zeman also testified that calls  
27 were classified by individuals, and not the Voicebox system, as either pertinent,  
28 non-pertinent, no audio, not monitored, privileged, and malfunction. Agent Zeman

1 explained that where a call that contained audio was classified as “not monitored,”  
2 the individual selecting the classification made a mistake.

3 Despite Agent Zeman stating that calls with audio that were classified as “not  
4 monitored” were erroneously labeled, Espudo at oral argument nevertheless  
5 contended that Agent Zeman’s testimony did not address instances where calls with  
6 audio were labeled as “not monitored.” In light of Agent Zeman’s testimony that  
7 such instances were a mistake and Stewart’s declaration stating that the version of  
8 Voicebox used in the United States does not allow calls that are not monitored live  
9 to be recorded, Espudo’s arguments are merely unsupported assertions. Espudo also  
10 noted that on cross-examination, Agent Zeman stated that he did not recall checking  
11 whether calls classified as “not monitored” contained audio. However, this  
12 statement does not demonstrate that calls not monitored were recorded.

13 Accordingly, in light of Agent Zeman’s testimony and Stewart’s declaration  
14 that only calls monitored live may be recorded, and the lack of evidence to the  
15 contrary, the Court finds that the Government has met its burden to show proper  
16 minimization regarding the use of Voicebox. The Court therefore **DENIES**  
17 Espudo’s motion to suppress as the Voicebox interception technology complies  
18 with minimization requirements.

19 **B. Improper Minimization of Calls**

20 Espudo next cites some specific calls that he argues were not properly  
21 minimized, such as sessions that were labeled as non-pertinent but contained audio.  
22 [Doc. No. 983-1, Espudo’s Mot. at 7-10.] Gutierrez raises a similar argument in his  
23 motion. Gutierrez argues that the minimization provisions in the wiretap orders  
24 were “manifestly violated by the [G]overnment during these interceptions, resulting  
25 in the interception of hundreds of communications unrelated to the offenses for  
26 which interception was authorized.” [Doc. No. 975-1, Gutierrez’s Mot. at 4.]  
27 Gutierrez presents statistics regarding the number of calls intercepted and the  
28 number of calls minimized: more than 7,000 calls were intercepted over target

1 telephone 7; the Government's line sheets indicated that 99 calls were minimized;  
2 and 174 of the captured calls were listed as pertinent. [Id. at 5.] Gutierrez uses  
3 these statistics to argue that "the overwhelming number of calls and electronic  
4 responses [text messages] received over [target telephone 7] were not pertinent and  
5 apparently not minimized." [Id.] Gutierrez concludes that there was a "wholesale  
6 failure to minimize conversations unrelated to the offenses for which interception  
7 authorization had been granted . . . ." [Id.] The Court will consider both motions  
8 together.

9 The Government argues that it made "substantial, reasonable efforts to  
10 minimize communications not otherwise subject to interception." [Doc. No. 1004,  
11 Govt.'s Opp. at 4.] In support, the Government details several procedures, which it  
12 argues complies with the minimization requirement. [Doc. No. 1004, Govt.'s Opp.  
13 at 3-4; Doc. No. 1004-1, Ex. A, Zeman Decl. at 2-4.] Additionally, the Government  
14 contends that Gutierrez's motion is "misleading." [Doc. No. 1004, Govt.'s Opp. at  
15 4.] The Government clarifies that although more than 7,000 interceptions occurred  
16 over target telephone 7, approximately 1,351 were completed and only 326  
17 exceeded two minutes in length. [Id. at 5.] Of the 326 calls that exceed two  
18 minutes, 80 were classified as pertinent. [Id.] Therefore, 246 were deemed non-  
19 pertinent. [Id.] Of these 246 calls, approximately 126, or 51%, were minimized.  
20 [Id.]

21 In a case where the defendants did not challenge the introduction of specific  
22 conversations into evidence on the ground that monitoring agents should have  
23 minimized those particular conversations, the Ninth Circuit only examined whether  
24 the government had made a prima facie showing of compliance with the  
25 minimization requirement. United States v. Torres, 908 F.2d 1417, 1423 (9th Cir.  
26 1990). "Minimization requires that the government adopt reasonable measures to  
27 reduce the interception of conversations unrelated to the criminal activity under  
28 investigation to a practical minimum while permitting the government to pursue



1 legitimate investigation. . . . The standard for minimization is reasonableness.” Id.  
2 (internal citation omitted); see also United States v. Rivera, 527 F.3d 891, 904 (9th  
3 Cir. 2008) (“The minimization techniques used do not need to be optimal, only  
4 reasonable.”). “The United States Supreme Court has stressed that, because of the  
5 necessarily ad hoc nature of any determination of reasonableness, there can be no  
6 inflexible rule of law that will decide every case.” McGuire, 307 F.3d at 1199  
7 (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 139 (1978)).

8 In Torres, the Ninth Circuit found the following procedures in combination to  
9 be reasonable and to not run afoul of the minimization requirement: (1) monitoring  
10 agents were instructed on the requirements and the need for minimization, and were  
11 required to read the minimization guidelines; (2) supervising agents were present in  
12 the wire room during the interceptions; and (3) an Assistant U.S. Attorney  
13 (“AUSA”) was on call to answer questions regarding minimization. Torres, 908  
14 F.2d at 1423.

15 Further, “[t]he statute does not forbid the interception of all nonrelevant  
16 conversations, but rather instructs the agents to conduct the surveillance in such a  
17 manner as to ‘minimize’ the interception of such conversations.” Scott, 436 U.S. at  
18 140. “In determining whether the agents properly minimized, it is . . . important to  
19 consider the circumstances of the wiretap. For example, when the investigation is  
20 focusing on what is thought to be a widespread conspiracy more extensive  
21 surveillance may be justified in an attempt to determine the precise scope of the  
22 enterprise.” Scott, 436 U.S. at 140. “[I]t may [also] be important to determine at  
23 exactly what point during the authorized period the interception was made. During  
24 the early stages of surveillance the agents may be forced to intercept all calls to  
25 establish categories of nonpertinent calls which will not be intercepted thereafter.”  
26 Id. at 141.

27 “Because many telephone calls are brief in duration, a listener frequently  
28 cannot determine a particular call’s relevance to the investigation before the call has



1 been completed.” United States v. Homick, 964 F.2d 899, 903 (9th Cir. 1992). In  
2 Homick, the Ninth Circuit held that the Government’s instruction to agents to listen  
3 to all conversations for two minutes and to then terminate non-pertinent calls after  
4 that time did not violate the statute. Id. The Ninth Circuit has also held that a  
5 minimization provision that allowed a call to be intercepted for a “reasonable time,  
6 usually not more than two minutes to determine whether the conversation concerns  
7 criminal activities” was adequate. See Rivera, 527 F.3d at 905.

8 Finally, the Supreme Court has cautioned that “blind reliance on the  
9 percentage of nonpertinent calls intercepted is not a sure guide to the correct  
10 answer. Such percentages may provide assistance, but there are surely cases . . .  
11 where the percentage of nonpertinent calls is relatively high and yet their  
12 interception was still reasonable.” Scott, 436 U.S. at 140.

13 Here, although Espudo cites specific examples where he believes the agents  
14 did not properly minimize, Defendants do not challenge the introduction of specific  
15 conversations into evidence. Therefore, the Court need only examine whether the  
16 Government has made a prima facie case of compliance with the minimization  
17 requirement. Torres, 908 F.2d at 1423.

18 Agent Zeman testified at oral argument that all agents were obligated to read  
19 the minimization instructions before conducting any live monitoring. He said that  
20 each monitor signed the minimization instructions. He also stated that the names of  
21 individuals to call in case the monitors had any questions were both posted on the  
22 wall of the wire room and given to the monitors. Agent Zeman testified that each  
23 shift in the wire room had a designated supervisor. He also stated that questions to  
24 him from the monitors were common. Regarding the nature of the investigation,  
25 Agent Zeman testified that the individuals being monitored often used code words,  
26 which differed among the gangs and even individuals, during their communications.

27 Corroborating Agent Zeman’s testimony regarding the minimization  
28 procedures are Government Exhibits 1 through 8, which are the minimization

1 instructions given to the supervising and monitoring agents. [Govt. Ex. 1-8.] The  
2 instructions stated, *inter alia*, that agents “may monitor calls for a period of time--  
3 generally up to two minutes--to determine if a conversation is pertinent” and must  
4 minimize calls they determine are not pertinent. [See, e.g., Govt. Ex. 1 at  
5 12CR0236-MINIMIZATION-2; Govt. Ex. 2 at 12CR0236-MINIMIZATION-20.]  
6 The instructions also included the phone numbers of AUSA Fred Sheppard (“AUSA  
7 Sheppard”), Agent Zeman, and others, with the instructions that “the supervising  
8 agents and attorneys are available 24 hours a day and may be contacted at any time  
9 with questions.” [See, e.g., *id.* at 12CR0236-MINIMIZATION-22-23; Govt. Ex.  
10 1 at 12CR0236-MINIMIZATION-4-5.] The instructions were also signed by the  
11 supervising and monitoring agents. [See, e.g., *id.* at 12CR0236-MINIMIZATION-  
12 5-7; Govt. Ex. 2 at 12CR0236-MINIMIZATION-23-25.] The Government also  
13 provided Government Exhibit 9, which includes video and audio recordings given  
14 to the monitors of AUSA Sheppard providing minimization instructions. [Govt. Ex.  
15 9.]

16 In light of the Supreme Court’s caution against blind reliance on percentages,  
17 the Court finds that Gutierrez’s arguments regarding statistics do not on their own  
18 show a failure to minimize. See *Scott*, 436 U.S. at 140. Furthermore, the Court is  
19 not persuaded by Espudo’s identification of a few calls that were deemed non-  
20 pertinent but were not minimized. As one district court explained, “[t]he statute  
21 does not refer to ‘pertinent’ or nonpertinent’ calls. To the extent that Defendant is  
22 attempting to expand the requirement of minimization to calls that were not  
23 minimized but were later determined to be nonpertinent, the Court must reject the  
24 argument.” *United States v. Borrayo-Gutierrez*, 119 F.Supp.2d 1168, 1184 (D.  
25 Colo. 2000). Rather, what is relevant to the inquiry is whether the minimization  
26 procedures were reasonable.

27 The Government has made a prima facie showing of compliance with the  
28 minimization requirement. Various factors identified by the Ninth Circuit and the

1 Supreme Court are present in the instant case which support a finding that the  
2 minimization procedures were reasonable: monitoring agents were instructed on the  
3 minimization requirements; the presence of supervising agents in the wire room  
4 when interceptions were occurring; and an AUSA was on call. See Torres 908 F.2d  
5 at 1423. Finally, this case involves a widespread conspiracy involving complex  
6 coded language, which justifies more extensive surveillance. See Scott, 436 U.S. at  
7 140.


8 Accordingly, the Government has met its burden to show proper  
9 minimization. Therefore, the Court **DENIES** Gutierrez's and Espudo's motions  
10 seeking suppression on the grounds of improper minimization of calls.

11 **CONCLUSION**

12 In light of the foregoing, the Court **DENIES** Espudo's motion to suppress all  
13 wire and oral communication interceptions on minimization grounds, and **DENIES**  
14 Gutierrez's motion to suppress wiretap evidence and derivative evidence for failure  
15 to minimize the intercepted communications.

16 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

17 **DATED:** June 1, 2013

18   
19 **IRMA E. GONZALEZ**  
20 **United States District Judge**